ESTELLE v. WILLIAMS AND THE WAIVER
OF DUE PROCESS TRIAL PROTECTIONS

"The presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence."'
In Estelle v. Williams,2 the United States Supreme Court lent this
maxim constitutional support, holding that an accused may not be
compelled to appear at his jury trial dressed in a prison uniform.
The Court's decision was based upon the defendant's presumption
of innocence guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment,3 and concluded that the presumption is undermined
by a defendant appearing in a prison uniform at his jury trial.
However, the thrust of Williams concerned not the due process
right itself, but rather the method by which such protections may
be waived. 4 The Court held that an accused's right not to be compelled to appear at trial in prison garb is not a fundamental right
relinquished only by a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.5
Instead, the right was considered a secondary safeguard which is
waived unless it is timely and intelligently asserted by counsel.0
By declaring that Williams had waived his right not to appear at
trial in prison garb, the Court jeopardized the accused's right to
a fair trial.
This Comment will examine the Williams case and the development of the right not to wear prison garb at trial. It will analyze
the Court's rejection of the traditional framework for examining
the waiver of fourteenth amendment due process trial rights. This
analysis will provide the foundation for a critical evaluation of the
decision and its effect upon the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Finally the Comment will compare Williams with similar decisions
regarding prejudicial information which may interfere with the decision-making process.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 492, 174 P.2d 717, 718 (1946).
425 U.S. 501, rehearing denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1976).
Id. at 504-D5.
Id. at 506-13.
Id. at 508 n.3.

6. Id. at 512-13.
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BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT NOT
TO WE:A PRISON GARB AT TRIAL
FederalCases
The majority of the federal cases on the wearing of prison garb
7
In
at trial have arisen in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
8
Brooks v. Texas, a leading case, the accused was tried in prison
garb and his counsel did not object. Nevertheless, the appellate
court declared it inherently unfair to try an accused while he was
dressed in prison garb.9 The court held that prison garb may infringe the accused's right to the presumption of innocence.
The basis upon which the accused's right is founded-the pre0
sumption of innocence-is not articulated in the Constitution.'
However, courts have not hesitated to find constitutional support
for the presumption. Some cases have traced the right from biblical
times through Roman and English common law and have concluded that the presumption of innocence "lies at the foundation of
the administration of our criminal law."" The presumption has
been termed "a basic component of a fair trial under our system of
criminal justice."' 2 The necessity of a fair trial is then based on
7. It is difficult to determine why the majority of cases have come from
the Fifth Circuit. One possible explanation is that unlike the judges in
other circuits, trial judges within the Fifth Circuit do not care whether the
accused is dressed in prison garb. The Fifth Circuit includes Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, and the Canal Zone. Also, of
the 11 prison garb cases to come from within this circuit in the past
10 years, seven began in Harris County (Houston), Texas. Furthermore,
out of six cases involving defendants not out on bail tried in Williams'
courtroom, in the two months surrounding his trial, all, six appeared in
prison garb. 425 U.S. at 533 (,Brennan, J., dissenting). The practice of
placing uniformed defendants on trial may therefore be local, instead of
circuit-wide.
8. 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).
9. "It is inherently unfair to try a defendant for crime while garbed
in his jail uniform, especially when his civilian clothing is at hand. No
insinuations, indications or implications suggesting guilt should be displayed before the jury, other than admissible evidence and permissible
argument." Id. at 624.
10. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). In Bently v. Crist, 469
F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1972), the Ninth Circuit stated that "[a]lthough the presumption of innocence is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it
has been recognized as a requirement of due process." Id. at 855 n.2.
See Deutch v.
11. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
12. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
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the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 13
In Brooks, and in cases following it, 14 exceptions to the rule that
a trial in prison garb is inherently unfair were established. There
are three situations in which the wearing of prison garb at trial
by the defendant will not constitute reversible error.
The first exception arises when the evidence presented against
the accused is so strong that the error committed is harmless,.r
Thus, while the Brooks rule is violated, this violation does not constitute reversible error. 16 In this situation the evidence is so compelling against the accused that his clothing is deemed not to have
affected the outcome of the trial. 17 However, the evidence establishing guilt must be overwhelming.' 8 Furthermore, the errors committed must be "so unimportant and insignificant that they may,
consistent with the United States Constitution, be deemed harmless,
not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction."' 0
13. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955): "A fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." Courts have used another
approach to confer constitutional status on the presumption of innocence.
The presumption is sometimes called the converse of the government's burden to prove an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States
v. Cummings, 468 F.2d 274, 280 (9th Cir. 1972). The reasonable doubt
standard has been held to be a necessary component of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). Thus, by tying this presumption to either the right to a fair trial,
or the reasonable doubt standard, courts have found a constitutional basis
for the presumption of innocence in the due process clause.
14. Smith v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. Beto, 474
F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1973); Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1973); Hollins v. Beto, 467 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972);
Goodspeed v. Beto, 460 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1972); Garcia v. Beto; 452 F.2d
655 (5th Cir. 1971); Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1971); St.
Jules v. Beto, 371 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 505 F.2d 656
(5th Cir. 1974); McWilliams v. Estelle, 378 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Tex. 1973),
appeal dismissed, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); Bates v. Estelle, 360 F.
Supp. 1278 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Noble v. Beto, 325 F. Supp. 607 (S.D. Tex.
1971).
15. Smith v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. Beto, 474
F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Beto, 373 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D. Tex.
1974); Bates v. Estelle, 360 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Noble v. Beto,
325 F. Supp. 607 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
16. See note 15 supra.
17. Id.
18. Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1971). The court cites
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), for the proposition that
"[b]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Chapman involved a district attorney commenting upon a defendant's failure to testify.
19. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). The Fifth Circuit reversed Williams because it believed that the reasonable doubt standard as
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The second exception arises when a defendant is tried for an offense which occurred while he was in prison.2 0 In this situation
the jury will eventually learn during the course of the trial that
the defendant is a prisoner. The Fifth Circuit therefore holds that
there is no prejudice when the jury sees the accused in a prison
21
uniform.
The third exception to the Brooks rule is the most complex. This
exception occurs when the defendant and his counsel knowingly
and willingly agree that the defendant will go to trial in prison
22
This tactic
garb in the hope of gaining sympathy from the jury.
23
The
right.
accused's
of
the
a
waiver
constitute
to
held
been
has
to guilt had not been met. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 211-12. After

reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that "we find the evidence of

malice aforethought and of intent to kill insufficient to sustain the conviction under the standard promulgated in Chapman.... The evidence in this
case is not so strong as to warrant the conclusion that the constitutional
error of trying Williams in prison garb was harmless."

20. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.

971 (1973):
Stahl's complaint of being tried in prison garb, if indeed he was,
gives us little pause. He was on trial for the murder of a fellow
inmate in the Louisiana State Prison where prison garb was Stahl's

normal attire. The jury necessarily knew that he was a prison inmate both at the time that he was alleged to have committed the
crime and at the time of his trial. No prejudice can result from
seeing that which is already known.

Id. at 557.

21. An argument could be made that a prisoh uniform does much more
than inform the jury that the defendant is a prisoner. The uniform
gives the appearance of one whom the state regards as deserving
to be so attired. It brands him as convicted in the state's eyes....
It separates him from the ordinary defendant who may appear in
his best 'Sunday suit' and fittings. The defendant is thereby placed
in a psychological, emotional disadvantage.
Commonwealth v. Keeler, 216 Pa. Super. 193, 197, 264 A.2d 407, 409 (1970).

At least some courts have found that the presumption of innocence extends
to prisoners on trial as well: Dennis v. Dees, 278 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. La.
1968); State v. Juergens, 240 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa 1976); People v. Roman,
35 N.Y.2d 978, 324 N.E.2d 885, 365 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1975). See Anti-Fascist
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 n.19 (1954): "[J]ustice must not

only be done, but must manifestly be seen to be done."

(Frankfurter, J.,

concurring.) Quotation is from Lord Hewart, C.J. in Rex v. Sussex Justices,
1 K.B. 256, 259 (1924).

22. The defendant also has a second advantage: He would have a sure
basis for appeal and retrial if convicted. Garcia v. Beto, 452 F.2d 655 (5th
Cir. 1971).
23. Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Fifth Circuit has held that an accused "may not remain silent and
willingly go to trial in prison garb and thereafter claim error."2 4
Difficulties occur, however, when the defendant and his counsel
unintentionally fail to object to the prison garb. Many cases have
been appealed to the Fifth Circuit on the ground that the defendant
had not willingly waived his right. 25 The court has remanded such
cases for a determination of whether the failure to object was
motivated by hopes of a tactical advantage, or was an unknowing,
involuntary waiver. 26 If no deliberate desire to be tried in prison
garb is shown, the defendant must be retried. 27
McWilliams v. Estele,2 8 which preceded Williams, attempted to
streamline this cumbersome system of determining the defendant's
motive. In McWilliams, the court declared that the waiver of the
right should be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.2 9 This holding
made it impossible for the right not to wear prison garb at trial
to be waived unless the accused positively relinquished it.3°
The cases arising out of other circuits generally follow these
rules.3 ' A Third Circuit case, Lemons v. United States, 32 was remanded for a determination of whether the defendant's failure to
object had been a deliberate tactical decision, or an involuntary re24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Hollins v. Beto, 467 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Goodspeed v.
Beto, 460 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1972); St. Jules v. Beto, 371 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.
Tex.), appeal dismissed, 505 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. Hollins v. Beto, 467 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Goodspeed v. Beto, 460
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1972).
27. Hollins v. Beto, 467 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
In this present case the record does not show that appellee objected
to being tried in jail clothing, nor does it show an express waiver
on his part. The district court erred in granting relief without considering whether there was a voluntary waiver. We reverse and

remand for an evidentiary hearing on this issue ....
Id. at 952.
28. 378 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Tex. 1973), appeal dismissed, 507 F.2d 1278
(5th Cir. 1975).
29. Id. at 1381. There is some doubt whether the court actually advocated a total change to the standard set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938). While the court declared that "the question of waiver must
be determined under the traditional standard of 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,'" it nevertheless stated
that this analysis must be "read in connection with the Fifth Circuit's treatment of waiver in the jail clothes context." 378 F. Supp. at 1381. This
latter statement seems to qualify the advocacy of a complete change to the
Johnson analysis. Instead, this may be only a tentative first step in that
direction.
30. 378 F. Supp. at 1381.
31. Lemons v. United States, 489 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1974); Bently v. Crist,
469 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1972).
32. 489 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1974).
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linquishment of his right. In the Ninth Circuit the court declared

appearance at trial in prison garb was prejuthat the defendant's
33
dicial error.

However, some federal courts have declined to follow the Fifth
35
Circuit's analysis.3 4 The Tenth Circuit in Watt v. Page declared
that a trial in prison garb is not inherently prejudicial. Rather,
all the facts and circumstances at trial must be examined to deter36
mine whether the defendant was prejudiced.

State Courts
Prison garb cases from state courts fall into three general cate37
gories. Many cases have followed the Fifth Circuit's analysis.
Other cases have held that the wearing of prison garb is not in38
and that the defendant on appeal has the
herently prejudicial,
39
An objection by counsel is
burden of showing actual prejudice.
40
Finally, at least one court has
generally also necessary to appeal.
held that no prejudice will result from an accused appearing at trial

in prison garb. 41

THE FACTS OF Williams
On May 29, 1970, a fight took place between Williams and
Neatherlin, the landlord of an apartment complex in which Wil42
The fight apparently reliams had previously been a tenant.
33. Bently v. Crist, 469 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1972).
34. Anderson v. Watt, 475 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1973); Watt v. Page, 452
F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972).
35. 452 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 1176-77. The trend of the Burger Court to favor the use of
the "totality of the circumstances" test would permit the conclusion that
the Court's holding in Williams would adopt the reasoning in Watt v. Page.
See Address by Yale Kamisar, Kenneth J. Hudson Lecture on Criminal
Law: The Burger Court Slides Down the Mountain (Feb. 1, 1973).
37. See Anthony v. State, 521 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1974); Miller v. State,
457 S.W.2d 848 (Ark. 1970); Ephraim v. State, 471 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971).
38. See Sharpe v. State, 119 Ga. App. 222, 166 S.E.2d (1969); Scott v.
State, 88 Nev. 682, 504 P.2d 10 (1972); State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501
P.2d 107 (1972).
39. Sharpe v. State, 119 Ga. App. 222, 166 S.E.2d 645 (1969); Scott v.
State, 88 Nev. 682, 504 P.2d 10 (1972).
40. Id.
41. State v. Archuletta, 28 Utah 2d 255, 501 P.2d 263 (1972).
42. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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sulted from the landlord's belief that Williams owed him money.
Neatherlin was allegedly stabbed and critically injured by Williams.
subsequently charged with assault with intent to comWilliams was
43
mit murder.
During his trial, Williams wore a uniform clearly marked "Harris
County Jail."' 4 4 His counsel did not object to Williams' clothing
at any time during trial.4 5 Convicted, Williams subsequently filed
a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court,46 Southern
District of Texas, claiming that his jury trial in prison garb uncon47
stitutionally infringed his right to the presumption of innocence.
The district court agreed that the trial court had erred but held
the error harmless because the evidence against Williams had been
so overwhelming that his wearing of prison clothing could have
made no difference. 48 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed 49 on the ground that the prison uniform might have influenced the outcome of the trial.5 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the wearing of prison garb at a jury trial5 1
43. Id. at 336-38.
44. Id. The clearly marked uniform precluded the raising of the issue
of whether the clothes were really prison garb. Several cases have stated

what does not constitute prison clothing: Klingler v. Erickson, 328 F. Supp.

674 (S.D. 1971) (plain gray shirt, jacket, and pants with no distinctive
marks); Barksdale v. State, 255 Ark. 272, 499 S.W.2d 851 (1973) (white
bell-bottom pants, a gold shirt, white and brown striped jacket and house
shoes with no evidence of any name or number on any of the clothing);
State v. Thomas, 325 So. 2d 593 (La. 1976) (gray coveralls); State v. Tennant, 262 La. 941, 265 So. 2d. 230 (1972) (all four defendants in blue and
white striped pants, three with white undershirt, the other in a blue and
white striped shirt); State v. Moon, 44 Ohio App. 2d. 275, 337 N.E.2d 794
(1975) (non-descript blue jeans and light blue shirt); State v. Archuletta,
28 Utah 2d 255, 501 P.2d 263 (1972) (undershirt and denim overalls).
Bently v. Crist, 469 F.2d 854, 856 n.4 (9th Cir. 1972), described prison
clothing as "any attire with the word 'jail' or 'sheriff' stenciled on it .... "
See United States v. Fideler, 457 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1972), in which petitioner argued that he wore prison clothing at trial, but evidence showed
that the jail in which he was held did not issue prison uniforms.
45. 364 F. Supp. 335, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
46. Id.
47. Id.

48. Id. at 343.
49. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d. 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
50. Id. at 212.
51. Courts have consistently held that wearing prison garb during a
bench trial is not prejudicial, apparently because the trial judge is able to
overlook the situation. Diamond v. Social Serv. Dep't, 263 F. Supp. 971
(E.D. Pa. 1967); People v. Arntson, 10 Mich. App. 718, 160 N.W.2d 386
(1968).
However, an argument can be made that although the trial judge may

not be prejudiced by the prison garb, the clothing is nevertheless an "affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge

1258

[VOL.

Comments

14: 1252, 19773

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

52
was inherently prejudicial.

The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court, noting cases from the Fifth Circuit, declared
that an accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison
clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption of
innocence.5 3 The remainder of the decision was concerned with the
method by which the right is waived.
The Court began its examination of the waiver of the right by
noting that the rule set forth by the lower courts was not a mechanical, per se rule.5 4 Instead, the Court described the three major exceptions to the rule that a defendant is not considered inherently
prejudiced by a jury trial in prison clothing. 55 Relying on the third
exception, the Court noted the "frequent" practice of a defendant
standing trial in prison garb as a defense tactic to elicit sympathy
from the jury."
Because of the prevalence of this practice, the majority concluded
that an accused must make a timely objection to his trial in jail
garments. Otherwise, the failure to object would negate the presence of state compulsion which is necessary to establish a violation
of the Constitution.5" The Court noted that the trial judge should
not be faulted for failing to ask the accused about his motives for
going to trial in jail clothes.
To require the judge to make such an inquiry would suggest that
he has the same duty as in a Johnson v. Zerbst 5s situation. In that
case the Court declared that the trial judge must ascertain that
the accused personally waives his right to counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 59 The Court in Williams declared that,
"we are not confronted with an alleged relinquishment of a funda60
mental right of the sort at issue in Johnson v. Zerbst....
is seeking to uphold."

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1969).

See

People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 971 (1963).
52. 425 U.S. at 502.
53. Id. at 504. The Court tied the presumption of innocence to the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment through both the fair trial
right and the reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 503.
54. Id. at 507.
55. Id. at 506-08.
56. Id. at 508.
57. Id. at 512-13.

58. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
59. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976).
60. Id. at 508 n.3.
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Looking at the facts in the Williams case, the Court found no
objection made by the defendant or his counsel. 61 Objections
should be interposed in order to call the matter to the trial judge's
attention so that he will have an opportunity to remedy the situ03
ation.62 Thus, the Court refused to overturn Williams' conviction.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, in dissent, raised two objections to the Court's
analysis. First, he argued that prison garb robs the defendant of
dignity and respect. 4 Furthermore, the fact-finding process is endangered by a defendant wearing a prison uniform because juries
will be influenced by his appearance." The objection requirement
is "irrational on its face" because these dangers will exist whether
the defendant makes a timely objection or not.60
Justice Brennan's second argument advocates the use of the
Johnson v. Zerbst test.6 7 The majority defined the prison garb
right as a contingent one, which does not come into existence
unless it is affirmatively asserted. The dissent argued that the
right should not be lost unless the accused knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily consents to a trial in prison garb. s The higher
level of waiver is necessary because the right involved is a fundamental constitutional safeguard that seriously affects the fairness
and accuracy of the judicial fact-finding process. 69
In concluding the argument, the dissent voiced fears that the objection requirement could spread to other trial rights guaranteed
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 0 Rights
which traditionally have been measured by Johnson v. Zerbst's
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver analysis could be eroded
by the Court's decision:7 1 "By defining the due process right in
prison garb cases in terms of state compulsion, the Court opens the
61. Id. at 509-10.
62. Id. at 508. Two justices concurred with the majority. They agreed
that the defendant lost his right by failing to assert it at the proper time,
and declared that because it was a "trial-type right" defendant's counsel
could effectively bind the accused to his waiver. Id. at 514 (Powell &
Stewart, JJ., concurring).
63. Id. at 508.
64. Id. at 518.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 520.
67. Id. at 521.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 522-23.
70. Id. at 521 n.5.
71. Id.
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door for the complete abandonment of this Johnson v. Zerbst doc72
trine.'
CRITICAL EVALUATION OF Williams
The Johnson-Noia-Henry Analysis Framework
The Williams decision must be compared to previous holdings on
the waiver of the accused's due process rights. The first major case
on the waiver of rights was Johnson v. Zerbst.7 3 In Johnson the

Court held that a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision is
needed to waive the right to counsel. The Court expressly stated
that this rule applied to the right to the assistance of counsel. However, after Fay v. Noia7 4 its application to other rights remained in
doubt. In Noia, the lower court denied an accused habeas corpus
relief because he had failed to make a timely appeal of his conviction.7 r The Supreme Court stated instead that an accused may waive
his rights only pursuant to the rule in Johnson.6 The Court also
ruled that waivers must be "the considered choice of the petitioner.
A choice made by counsel, not participated in by the petitioner, does
not automatically bar relief." 7 7 The Court in Noia expanded the
Johnson doctrine to all rights that an accused can waive.7 8
However, this ruling was limited two years later in Henry v.
72. Id. at 523 n.6.
73. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
74. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
75. Id. at 399. The Johnson-Noia standard concerns the grant of habeas
corpus to state-court prisoners with constitutional claims. A grant of the
writ allows the argument to be heard by the federal courts. The petitioner
must show he has exhausted his state remedies before his petition will
be granted. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419 (1963); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S.
183, 194-95 (1892). The examination of habeas corpus procedure, therefore, would seem to cover only a portion of the prison garb cases. As a
practical matter, however, this procedure covers many prison garb appeals.
This is because only in the first category of state cases-where courts declare the wearing of prison garb violative of the presumption of innocence
-will petitioner be granted relief. In all other cases, the defendant will
have to appeal his case to the federal courts by filing a writ of habeas
corpus.
76. "The classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst
* . .furnishes the controlling standard."
372 U.S. at 439.
77. Id.
78. Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 Inm. L. REV. 1175 (1970); Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights:
Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV.1 (1971).
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0
In Henry, the petitioner applied for habeas corpus
Mississippi."
relief because his counsel had failed to object to inculpatory evidence introduced at trial.8 0 He argued that under Noia his counsel
could not waive his right to object, that such rights may be waived
only by the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The
Court disagreed, stating that absent "exceptional circumstances,"
counsel's deliberate decision not to object will constitute an effective
waiver.8 '

The Noia and Henry decisions appear to conflict. In Noia the
Court ruled that a defendant may not be bound by his counsel's
waiver of his rights. The ruling in Henry declared that the defendant's right had been effectively waived by his counsel's decision.
However, other courts have declared that Noia and Henry are distinguishable by the fact that the former did not involve a "trialtype" right.8 2
In Henry the objection dealt directly with "a matter which only
trial counsel would be equipped to pass on in the exercise of judgment under the circumstances presented by the exigencies of
trial. '8 3 By comparing the two cases, lower courts have held decisions made during the trial must be entrusted to counsel because
he is more familiar with courtroom procedure, and because such
decisions must be made quickly-frequently in response to an unexpected situation. 84 Therefore, in these situations the accused must
be bound by his attorney's decisionYs '
Conversely, the decision in Noia affects a non-trial-type right. The
right to habeas corpus relief is asserted as the result of pre-trial
consultations between the defendant and his counsel,80 rather than
79. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
80. Id. at 451.
-81. Id.
82. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969); Nelson v. People, 346
F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965); People v. Williams,
36 Ill. 2d 194, 222 N.E.2d 321 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1967); Grano,
supra note 78, at 1215; Tigar, supra note 78, at 17-18.
83. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 1969).
84. See cases listed in note 82 supra.
85. Id.

86. The decisions covered by Noia are ones made pre-trial. Noia is concerned with the pre-trial aspect of a criminal proceeding-when the attorney and client have time to consult over matters such as the decision
whether to stipulate a trial on the preliminary hearing transcript (Wilson
v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 919 (1965); Wood
v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942)), or whether to contest the
state's case (Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) ). Accord, Nelson v.
People, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965); Grano,
supra note 78, at 1271.
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during trial. In this situation, the opportunity for the defendant to
personally waive his rights according to the Johnson standard still
87
exists.
Thus, the question of waiver focuses upon the degree of consultation between counsel and accused and the stage of the proceeding
when the waiver was made.8 8 If the decision was made during the
trial when there was no time for consultations between accused and
counsel, Henry permits a waiver of rights by the attorney to bind
the accused. When the decision takes place outside the courtroom,
Noia requires that the accused personally waive his rights.
However, the inquiry into waiver depends upon the right involved as well. In Henry, the Court stated that counsel's waiver
would also bind the accused, absent "exceptional circumstances."8 9
What constitutes exceptional circumstances has been infrequently
articulated by the courts.90 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Brookhart v. Janis9 ' supports the view that exceptional
circumstances exist whenever fundamental or significant rights are
waived. In Brookhart, counsel did not contest the state's case nor
cross-examine witnesses. Instead, counsel stated that he would
require that the state prove only a prima facie case. The Court
ruled that this so crippled the defendant's right to confront his
accusers that it was tantamount to a plea of guilty.92 The defendant
was required to personally waive his rights knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily, despite the fact that counsel's decision was trialbased.9 3 Thus, certain fundamental rights may not be waived by
counsel as a trial tactic.
The conclusion that fundamental rights may not be waived except
through the Johnson method has also been reached outside the "ex87. Grano, supra note 78, at 1215; Tigar, supra note 78, at 17-18.
88. Grano, supra note 78, at 1215. See Tigar, supra note 78, at 17-18.
89.

379 U.S. at 451.

90. Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 919
(1965) (exceptional circumstances can be decided only on a case-by-case
basis). See Grano, supra note 78, at 1219.
91. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).

92. Id. at 7.
93. Id. In Ledbetter v. Warden, 368 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,

386 U.S. 971 (1967), defense counsel waived all objections to a confession
which was the sole evidence against the accused. The court held that counsel's waiver could not bind the accused because the waiver "went to the
very foundation of the proceeding." Id. at 494.
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ceptional circumstances" framework. Other courts have concluded
that certain trial safeguards are so fundamental to the accused's
right to due process that they may not be waived by counsel, even
if they might be trial-typedecisions. 94
FundamentalRights

As a result of Johnson, Noia and Henry, courts have generally
taken a two-step approach to analyzing a waiver of due process
rights. The first step is to determine whether the right waived
is fundamental. Either under the special circumstances rule in
Henry, or out of general due process considerations, fundamental
rights must be waived by the accused personally0 5
Determining the existence of fundamentality has not been outlined by any specific test.96 Courts generally examine the impact
97
the waiver has upon the accused's ability to obtain a fair trial.
In Boykin v. Alabama,98 the Court held that the accused was required to personally announce his decision of a plea of guilty because the plea entailed the waiver of three fundamental constitutional rights: trial by jury, confrontation, and the privilege against
self-incrimination. 99 Johnson v. Zerbst elevated to this fundamental rights category the accused's right to the assistance of
counsel. 100 The Court also declared that the right to a jury trial
94. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 1969); People v. Williams,

36 Ill. 2d 194, 222 N.E.2d 321 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1967);

Grano, supra note 78, at 1208. This concept was succinctly stated in Com-

ment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation,Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1262 (1966):
Certain basic protections . . . have been deemed to be essential;

and most courts have refused to accept a nonpersonal waiver of
these rights without first ascertaining from the defendant himself
that this action was done with both his permission and his awareness of the consequences. Thus, most courts, either expressly or
impliedly, have made a distinction between such "fundamental
rights" and other "trial decisions."
Id. at 1267.
95. See authority cited note 94 supra.
96. The courts have not used one specific test to measure the fundamentality of due process rights in criminal law. In Johnson v. Zerbst, the
right to counsel was deemed "necessary to insure fundamental human rights
of life and liberty," 304 U.S. at 462. In Ledbetter v. Warden, 368 F.2d 490
(4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967), the defense counsel's
waiver of objections to the only evidence against the accused was not binding on the defendant because the right waived "went to the very foundation

of the proceeding." Id. at 494.

97. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Ledbetter v. Warden, 368
F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967).

98. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
99. Id. at 243.

100. 304 U.S. at 464.
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must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived by the accused personally.' 0 '
The fundamentality of the right in queston is weighed against

considerations of administrative efficiency and effective represen-

tation. 1 02 The court cannot stop the proceedings every time the
accused faces a waiver decision and ascertain whether he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any objection. This process would not only slow trials considerably, but would also usurp
counsel's role as the accused's representative. 10 3 The Court has thus
been reluctant to increase the number of fundamental rights. 0 4
When considering the issue of fundamentality against the accused's right to stand trial in civilian clothing, the majority of
courts do not find the right fundamental. 0 5 This fact is illustrated
by the appellate courts' practice of remanding cases to determine
whether counsel had deliberately waived the right as a matter of
trial tactics. 10 6
Lesser Rights

Once the court determines that the right involved is not fundamental, Noia and Henry require the court to make a further analysis.107 The Court in Henry stated that "counsel's deliberate choice
of strategy would amount to a waiver binding upon petitioner." 0 8
When a prisoner petitions the federal court with a writ of habeas
101. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276 (1930).
102. Comment, supra note 94, at 1269.

103. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 1969); Nelson v. People,
346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965).

104. Comment, supra note 94, at 1269.
105. Although this issue was not examined by the Fifth Circuit cases,
with the exception of McWilliams v. Estelle, 378 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Tex.
1973), appeal dismissed, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975), the court's practice
of remanding the cases for a determination of counsel's motives is evidence
of the court's conclusion that the right is not fundamental.
106. The fact that the courts examined counsel's actions in determining
waiver necessitates the conclusion that the right was not considered fundamental, because fundamental rights may be waived only by the accused
personally. Hollins v. Beto, 467 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Hernandez v. Beto,
443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1971); St. Jules v. Beto, 371 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Tex.),
appeal dismissed, 505 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1974).
107. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
108. 379 U.S. at 451.
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corpus, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether counsel deliberately and knowingly waived the
accused's right.10 9 While the attorney could have waived the right
through silence at trial, at the evidentiary hearing the court will
determine whether counsel knew of the right and deliberately remained silent, or whether the right was waived inadvertently. 1 0
This hearing can cause difficulty for trial counsel. On the one hand,
an admission that the decision was a deliberate, tactical choice
would deny the accused relief. On the other hand, admitting inadvertence1 erodes the counsel's reputation for professional competence."'

The Noia-Henry distinction also requires the court to decide
whether the right involved was waived during the exigencies of
trial or was the result of considered consultations with the accused." 2 If it is a trial-type right, then and only then may counsel's
waiver bind the accused." 3 In other situations Noia requires that
the accused personally waive the right under the restrictions listed
in Johnson."4 Therefore, in determining the question of waiver of
lesser due process rights, the district court must first determine
whether the right is trial based. If it is not, Noia still requires
the defendant to personally waive the right according to the
Johnson standards." 5 If the right is considered a trial-type,
counsel's knowing and deliberate waiver can bind the accused." 6
However, the court must decide whether counsel waived the right
knowingly and deliberately. If the right was waived by counsel
deliberately and with knowledge, the accused is bound by that
waiver. 1 7 However, if the right was inadvertently waived by the
109. The requirement of an evidentiary hearing was mandated in Town-

send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The hearing is required whenever the
facts are in conflict about whether counsel's failure to object was deliberate
and knowing. Id. at 312-13.
110. In Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1966), the court stated
that "deliberate and knowing" meant defense counsel's knowledge of the
right to present a contention to the court. Id. at 26. If the court finds that
counsel's silence was not deliberate and was without knowledge of the right
to object, the prisoner's rights were not properly waived and a new
trial is ordered. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
111. Grano, supra note 78, at 1222.
112. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 1969); Nelson v. People,
346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965). "The decision as to whether to appeal is not
part of trial strategy. It is one that is made by the client, not his attorney.
There are numerous others . . . that fall in this class." Id. at 81 n.6.
113. See cases listed in note 112 supra.
114. 372 U.S. at 399.
115. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See cases listed in note 112 supra.
116. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
117. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
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defense counsel, the accused's rights were not properly waived and
18
a new trial is ordered."
The lower court cases concerning prison garb give inadequate discussion to the question of trial-type rights. 119 However, the examination of counsel's motives implies that the courts consider the right
to be trial associated. In Garcia v. Beto, 20 the court examined only
counsel's acts in concluding that his knowing and deliberate decision bound the accused. 12 ' Thus, the lower courts have generally
adhered to the analysis set forth in the Johnson-Noia-Henryline.
Williams and the Johnson-Noia-Henry Framework
At first, the Court in Williams appears to follow the prior method
of analysis. The majority finds that the prison garb issue does not
involve "an alleged relinquishment of a fundamental right of the
sort at issue in Johnson v. Zerbst."'22 This finding is consistent
with the majority of the lower court decisions and follows the preexisting analytical framework of first determining the fundamentality of the right involved.
When the Court turns to the second step, however, it breaks with
the previous cases. The majority, without discussing either Noia
or Henry, states that the right will be waived by counsel if he fails
to make a timely objection. 123 There is no discussion of where this
decision fits into the previous method of analysis. In prior cases,
the next step had involved a determination of whether the right
was trial or non-trial associated. In Williams, the Court mentions
that the right involves a "strategic and tactical" decision. 2 4 This
statement could be interpreted to mean the same thing as a trial118. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
119. The federal court cases did not expressly mention whether the right
was trial-based, but the examination of counsel's motives implies that it
was.

120. 452 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1971).

121. Id. at 656.
122. 425 U.S. at 508 n.3.
123. Id. at 512-13.

124. "[O]nce a defendant has the assistance of counsel, the vast array
of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and
during trial rests with the accused and his attorney." Id. at 512 (emphasis
supplied).
125. Although the Supreme Court does not expressly state it is changing
"trial-type" to "strategic and tactical," such an inference can be drawn from
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type right. 125 However, "strategic and tactical" decisions can also
be made outside of the courtroom. 126 If the Court intends to equate
"strategic and tactical" with "trial-type" it expands the scope of
the Henry exception to Noia. 2 7 Thus counsel may effectively
waive the accused's rights whenever the choice involves a strategic
and tactical decision, instead of only during the pressurized atmos28
phere of trial.
The Court did more than expand the situations in which counsel
may waive an accused's rights. It completely changes the method
by which the right is waived. Traditionally, district courts would
next decide whether counsel had knowingly and deliberately
waived the accused's right.129 In Williams, however, the Court
makes no such analysis. Instead, the majority mentions that defense counsel "frequently" presents the defendant in jail clothes
in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury. 130 Because this
tactic is prevalent, the Court believes that attorneys are aware of
the possibility that an accused's right to a trial in civilian clothes
may be waived. 13 ' Therefore, whenever counsel fails to make a
timely objection to the accused's trial in prison garb, the Court irrebuttably presumes that he was aware of the possible prejudice and
18 2
failed to object deliberately and knowingly.
This is the first time that the Court has used this method of
waiver. The Court finds that the prevalance of a tactic means universal awareness of the opportunity to object.133 Because of this
the majority opinion. The only reference made to the type of rights which
counsel may waive is quoted in note 124 supra. The assumption that the
Court intended to widen the scope of trial-type rights is not without support. At least one court, United States v. Warden, 417 F. Supp. 970 (N.D.
Mich. 1976), has agreed with this interpretation of Williams:
Although the contours and limits of the Court's holdings [in
Williams and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) ] are obscure and their impact on other habeas proceedings is uncertain,
we discern that the Court is applying a less stringent standard for
determining waiver with respect to essentially strategic and tactical
decisions by a counselled accused.
Id. at 973.
126. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
127. See note 125 supra.
128. Id.
129. Hollins v. Beto, 467 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Goodspeed v. Beto,
460 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1972).
130. 425 U.S. at 508.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 508-12.
133. Id. at 508-10. The Court's argument lacks sound logic. Merely because there exists a frequent practice of placing an accused on trial in prison
garb, it does not follow that all-or even most-counsel are aware of the
accused's right to appear in civilian clothes. Moreover, the logical extension
of this argument would mean that the frequent practice of choosing a bench
trial would make the right to a jury trial waivable by silence, or the not
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awareness, counsel can now waive the accused's rights through silence. 34 This waiver-by-silence is in sharp contrast to the Johnson
requirement of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Under
Henry, counsel's silence did not necessarily mean a waiver. Instead,
the district court examined counsel's actions to determine whether
his silence had been the result of a knowing and deliberate decision
not to object. 13 5 The Williams decision eliminated the last step and
replaced it with the irrebuttable presumption that silence demonstrates a knowing and deliberate decision to waive the right.
The scope of this decision remains unresolved. The holding may
introduce a third group of trial rights, having less importance than
fundamental or other rights, which can be waived by counsel's silence. 1 36 However the decision is more likely a partial reversal
of the Johnson-Noia-Henryline, requiring a timely objection to cir13 7
cumstances which might negate the presumption of innocence.
The Effect -of Williams
Two aspects of the Williams decision will produce harmful results.
First, the Court should have declared the right not to be compelled
to appear at jury trial in prison garb to be fundamental. The effect
uncommon practice of appearing pro se would mean that the right to counsel could be similarly relinquished. ,
134. Id. at 508-12.
135. See note 110 supra.
136. The declaration of a new form of waiver in Williams could signal
the establishment of a new category of rights which can be very easily
waived. Thus there would exist three basic categories of due process criminal safeguards: fundamental rights which would have to be waived by
the accused personally, adhering to the Johnson standards; lesser rights
which could be waived by defendant's attorney, but only if they are knowingly and deliberately waived; and Williams-type rights that can be waived
by silence.
137. The conclusion that Williams applies to all rights based upon the
presumption of innocence has been followed in Wright v. Texas, 533 F.2d
185 (5th Cir. 1976), which was decided after Williams: "We glean from
[Williams] that courts should not release state prisoners on a writ of
habeas corpus because of jurors seeing a defendant in a situation which
might negate the presumption of innocence, unless the defendant has taken
the steps at trial which might eliminate any possible prejudice." Id. at
188. This chipping away at the traditional test of waiver can also be
seen in Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), which was decided
the same day as Williams. In that case the Court held that counsel's failure
to object to the composition of the grand jury waived the right to object
for the accused as well. See State v. Reid, 559 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1976).
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of not finding the right fundamental will erode the accused's presumption of innocence and will jeopardize his right to a fair trial because of jury prejudice.
There can be no doubt that the presumption of innocence is a
fundamental right accorded the accused. 138 The Williams decision,
however, could make this presumption meaningless. The probable
effect of the decision will be to require a timely objection to threats
to the presumption of innocence. 13 9 Although the presumption itself will remain a fundamental right, due process rights based upon
the presumption will be diminished by allowing counsel to waive
them inadvertently by silence. 140 Moreover, the Williams decision
runs counter to other cases which have implied that presumptionof-innocence-based rights can be waived only knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily by the accused himself.' 4 1 The Court in
Williams failed to consider these cases. 42 The effect of the decision
will mean that other rights based upon the presumption of innocence will also be subject to waiver by counsel's silence. To protect the presumption's fundamental status, the Court should have
declared the right to wear civilian clothes at trial a fundamental
right.
In addition, the possibility of prejudice resulting from a trial in
prison garb is so strong 43 that the right should be declared funda138. Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); Coffin v. United States,
156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1971).
139. Wright v. Texas, 533 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1976). In Wright the
prisoner petitioned the district court, arguing that his trial in prison garb
and handcuffs was prejudicial. The court held that in light of Williams,
a failure to object at trial to the garb or handcuffs would constitute a
waiver. See note 137 supra.
140. See note 137 supra.
141. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Camp v. Arkansas,
404 U.S. 69 (1971).
142. The dissent does mention the cases in support of its argument that
the right should have been declared fundamental. 425 U.S. at 521-22 n.5
(dissenting opinion).
143. Numerous studies have shown that an unattractive defendant receives harsher treatment from juries: H. KALVEN & H. ZmisEL, THE AmESIcAN JURY (1966) ("It is now clear that the jury is often alienated by the
unattractiveness of the defendant..... .In the cases examined it is apparent that there is a considerable link, in the eyes of the jury, between
the unattractiveness of the defendant and his credibility." Id. at 385);
Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of Guilt, 8
J. RESEARCH IN PERSO ALITY 45 (1974) (a non-attractive defendant has a
greater certainty of being found guilty and of more severe punishment);
Nemeth & Sosis, A Simulated Jury Study: Characteristicsof the Defendant
and the Jurors, 90 J. Soc. PsYcH. 221 (1973) (a non-attractive defendant
received harsher sentencing); Willick, Social Class as a Factor Affecting
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mental. The sight of a defendant wearing a prison uniform can
144
produce a subtle and elusive prejudice in the minds of the jurors.
Judicial warnings to the jury would have little effect because, "the
influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that
it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of
145
the average man.'
Courts have recognized the dangerous influence of information
other than admissible evidence contaminating the impartiality of
jurors in pre-trial publicity cases. 46 When the danger of a pre147
judiced jury exists, the defendant is granted a change of venue,
48
or a conadditional peremptory challenges of prospective jurors,
49
an
accused
is
inherent
prejudice
when
tinuance.
Similarly, the
shackled at trial has caused the court to declare the practice unconJudicial Disposition, 13 CRIIVIINOLOGY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY J. 57 (1975)
(defendants from lower socio-economic levels received greater sentences).
It is obvious that if the accused receives worse treatment from juries due to
physical unattractiveness, the same would hold true for an accused in prison
garb. Dennis v. Dees, 278 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. La. 1968) ("To force a
defendant, against his will, to stand trial before a jury dressed in striped
prison garb is the very antithesis of the 'garb of innocence' and hence is, in
the opinion of this court, a deprivation of the due process of law guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment .... "); O'Halloran v. Rundle, 266 F. Supp.

173, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd., 384 F.2d 997 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 860 (1968) ("Unnecessary portrayal of a defendant as a criminal may
indeed constitute fundamental unfairness. E.g., prison garb at trial ....
[t]he appearance of the defendant before the jury otherwise than as a presumptively innocent citizen served no probative purpose."); Diamond v.
Social Servs. Dep't, 263 F. Supp. 971, 975 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ("Prejudice
[from prison garb] is heightened in a jury context."); People v. Eaddy,
115 Colo. 488, 492, 174 P.2d 717, 718 (1946) ("Prejudice from a prisoner
might ... be created thereby in the minds of the jurors."); Commonwealth
v. Keeler, 216 Pa. Super. 193, 197, 264 A.2d 407, 410 (1970) (prison clothing "prejudiced the jury against [the defendant] and demeaned him before conviction.")
144. See note 143 supra. The prejudicial effect of wearing prison garb
at a jury trial undermines the requirement that rights should not be waived
except by the Johnson standards if the result of an unknowing waiver
would erode the need "to insure fundamental rights of life and liberty."
304 U.S. at 462.
145. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961).
146. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
147. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
148. People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1970), in which the
defendant was given 160 peremptory challenges.
149. Comment, Pre-Trial Publicity, 34 Mo. L. REV. 538 (1969).
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stitutional, 1 50 except in cases where the state can show the necessity
for extreme security measures. 151
In situations similar to Williams, when the jury is in danger of
being influenced by information other than testimony and argument at trial, the Court has provided the accused with adequate
safeguards. 15 2 In Williams, however, the Court has increased the
likelihood of a defendant going to trial in a prison uniform, a practice which can endanger his right to a fair trial. The likelihood
of an unknowing waiver is apparent when the timing of the objection is examined. Although Williams is unclear on this point,
several cases have held that counsel must make an objection as soon
15 3
as the uniformed accused appears in the presence of the jury.
While a tardy objection should allow the defendant to change his
clothes at the soonest opportunity, the damage already done cannot
be effectively remedied. 5 4
The Williams decision greatly increases the danger of a contaminated jury, because the right involved is so easily waived and the
effect of the waiver is so serious. Furthermore, the new method
of waiver produces a substantial risk of a jury trial in prison garb.
By granting the right fundamental status, the Court would require
the trial judge to assure that the accused's waiver was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made,155 thus eliminating the danger
of an unfair trial.
The Court's second error involves the conclusion that attorneys
"frequently" present the accused at trial to hopefully garner jury
sympathy. 56 This statement is the basis for the Court's ruling that
the prison garb right can be waived by counsel's silence. 5 7 Unfor150. Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1973).
151. Accord, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
152. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); People v. Speck, 41 Ill.
2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1970).
153. Boswell v. Alabama, 537 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1976). In this postWilliams decision, the defense counsel objected to the prison garb during
the voir dire of the venire. The court then allowed defendant to change
from his uniform, but held that there was no ground for a mistrial because
counsel had waived the defendant's right until the time of the objection.
154. Boswell v. Alabama, 537 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1976); Watts v. State,
53 Ala. App. 518, 301 So. 2d 280 (1974); People v. Shaw, 7 Mich. App. 187,
151 N.W.2d 381 (1967); Pittman v. State, 488 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972); Clark v. State, 398 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
155. The trial judge may not have a strict legal duty to inquire into the
voluntariness or intelligence of the defendant's waiver. As a practical
matter, however, he does have such a duty, because if the record does not
show a waiver which adheres to the Johnson standards, the waiver is assumed to be involuntary. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
156. 425 U.S. at 508.
157. Id. at 508-512.
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tunately, there is no evidence that this is a frequent practice. In
support of its contention, the Court cited four cases. 158 Upon examination of these decisions, however, only one instance of this practice has actually been reported. 159 The other three cases simply
cite the first as an example of this tactic.160 Therefore, the Court's
basis for its departure from the Johnson-Noia-Henry analysis rests
on a scant factual basis.
The Court's departure from the traditional test signals the possibility of a dangerous trend in the area of criminal waiver. The
Williams holding could entail the complete demise of the Johnson
standard. There are now instances in which the accused's rights
can be waived through silence by an unknowing counsel. This occurrence certainly conflicts with the proclamation that, "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of constitutional rights. 16
The Williams decision is another example of the Burger Court's
erosion of criminal law doctrines declared to be axiomatic by the
Warren Court.162 The Williams decision is particularly significant
in view of the Court's limiting the situations in which prisoners'
writs of habeas corpus will be granted. The Court in Williams expands the rights which counsel-instead of the accused-may waive,
and relaxes the method by which rights are waived by allowing
silence to constitute a knowing and deliberate waiver. 6 3 If a right
is deliberately waived or by-passed in the state courts, there
64
may be no grant of habeas corpus by the federal courts.
158. Garcia v. Beto, 452 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1971), is the only reported
case where this tactic was actually used. The other three cases, Anderson
v. Watt, 475 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1973), Watt v. Page, 452 F.2d 1174 (10th

Cir. 1972), and Barber v. State, 477 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972),
merely cite Garcia as evidence of the tactic. The dissent commented that
the existence of only one case "hardly supports the Court's conclusion that
defendants 'frequently' hope to benefit by this 'tactic'." 425 U.S. at 521
n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority mentions no case where a defendant free on bail asked to appear at trial in jail clothes. This fact further
undermines the contention that this is truly a "frequent" trial tactic.
159. See note 158 supra.
160. Id.
161. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1936).
162. Address by Yale Kamisar, Kenneth J. Hudson Lecture on Criminal
Law: The Burger Court Slides Down the Mountain (Feb. 1, 1973).
163. See text following note 128 supra.
164. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
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Two other cases subsequent to Williams demonstrate the trend
of the Burger Court in restricting the use of habeas corpus in the
federal courts. In Francis v. Henderson,165 the Court ruled that
a prisoner waived habeas corpus relief challenging the composition
of the indicting grand jury, if counsel fails to make a timely objection, absent actual prejudice. The Court in Stone v. Powell0
stated that a prisoner will not be granted habeas corpus on grounds
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was
introduced at trial, if the state court has provided for full and fair
litigation of the fourth amendment claim.
Like the Mirandarule, 1 7 the Johnson-Noiasafeguards have been
the subject of the Court's gradual limitation of the accused's criminal rights. This bit-by-bit destruction could eventually lead to the
complete reversal of landmark cases in criminal law. 68
CONCLUSION:

A SOLUTION TO THE Williams PROBLEM

The decision in Williams makes it clear that the right to wear
civilian clothing at trial will not be granted fundamental status in
the near future. However, the harmful results of the decision can
be limited in a way other than that of declaring the right fundamental. A practical solution to this issue would be to place the
burden on the trial judge to make certain that no accused appears
before a jury in prison garb unless he desires such clothing.
Putting the burden on the trial judge is not only more convenient,
but also follows logically from similar burdens in analogous circum69
stances involving jury prejudice.
165. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
166. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
167. Several Burger Court opinions have eroded the Miranda rule:

Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) (restricting the definition of
"custodial interrogations" which triggers the necessity of Miranda warnings); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (repeated interrogations allowed without rewarning the suspect); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974) (conduct which violates the Miranda rule but not the accused's
right against self-incrimination may be permissible); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements made after defective warning may still
be used for impeachment purposes).
168. The so-called "revolutionary" criminal procedure decisions of
the Warren Court .

.

. have been largely ignored or circumvented

in practice by law enforcement officials and riddled with holes by
hostile lower courts....

Unlike the Warren Court, the Burger

Court has not tried to firm up the much publicized criminal procedure decisions or closed the emerging loopholes or blocked end
runs. Indeed, too often the Burger Court has run with the resisting lower courts, cheered them on .

.

,

or out run them.

Address by Yale Kamisar, Kenneth J. Hudson Lecture on Criminal Law:
The Burger Court Slides Down the Mountain (Feb. 1, 1973).
169. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1973).
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The trial judge is charged with the duty of ensuring the defendant's fair trial in cases where pretrial publicity poses the risk of
a biased jury: 170 "The courts shall take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside influences."' 17 1

The trial judge is charged not only with guarding

against swaying the jury with his own statements, but also with
"that disensuring that the jury is shielded from outside influences
172
turb the impartiality and judicial serenity of the trial."'
A similar duty should also arise in the case of an accused in prison
garb, not only because it follows logically from the previous cases
concerning jury contamination, but also because it is the most convenient and practical way of handling the problem. 1 3 Unlike other
issues which can be raised or waived at any time during trial, the
defendant's prison garb is an obvious situation. 74 The American
Bar Association agrees that the trial judge should be given this responsibility, reasoning that this duty arises because the presumpcan easily be undermined by an appearance in
tion of innocence
1 75
prison clothing.

The Court in Williams should have required the trial judge,
rather than defense counsel, to determine the accused's wishes before going to trial. This determination could have been accomplished by requiring the trial judge to make certain that the right
170. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
171. Id. at 363.

172. Meyer, The Trial Judge's Guide to News Reporting and Fair Trial,
60 J. Cinm. LAW 287 (1969). Likewise, when the defendant poses an unusual escape risk or is disruptive during trial, the trial judge is charged
with remedying the situation by that method which least endangers the
accused's right to a fair trial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
173. Trial judges should not allow a uniformed defendant in the court
until his motives are examined. In State v. Kinchen, 290 So. 2d 860 (La.
1974), when the judge noticed the defendant in prison garb, "he immediately caused the appellant to be returned to the jail to be dressed in
civilian clothes." Id. at 862. People v. Moon, 44 Ohio App. 2d 275, 337
N.E.2d 794 (1975): "[t]here is a long-standing practice at the jail that when
a person is brought over for a jury trial he dresses in civilian clothes."
When the defendant appeared in prison garb, "the court went out and immediately told the deputy to bring him out." Id. at 276, 337 N.E.2d at 796.
174. See note 173 supra.

175. ABA

STANDARDS,

FUNCTION

OF THE

TRIAL JUDGE

§

5.3 (1972).

"The

trial judge should not permit a defendant or witness to appear at trial in
the distinctive attire of a prisoner."

1275

has not been waived unknowingly.17 0 That result would eliminate
the danger of a uniformed defendant unknowingly prejudicing his
right to a fair trial. If the presumption of innocence requires the
garb of innocence, the accused should at least be asked whether he
wishes to wear his prison garb at trial.

STEVEN D. KRIEG

176. In order to meet the duty outlined by the ABA (see
the trial judge would have to insure that the defendant
telligently, and voluntarily waives his right to appear at
clothes. This duty could be met just before the accused
court at the first day of trial.

1276

note 175 supra),
knowingly, intrial in civilian
is to appear in

